In a Common Currency Area the Common Central Bank sets a uniform rate of inflation across countries, taking into account the area's economic conditions. Suppose countries in recession favor a more expansionary policy than countries in expansion: when national business cycles are not fully synchronized a conflict of interest between members arises. If member governments have an informational advantage over the state of their domestic economy, such conflict may create an adverse selection problem: national authorities overemphasize their shocks, in order to shape the common policy towards their needs. This creates an inefficiency over and above the one-policy-fits-all cost discussed in the optimal currency area literature.
Introduction
In a common currency area (CCA) national governments delegate monetary policy decisions to a supra-national authority, the Common Central Bank (CCB). The CCB sets a uniform rate of inflation across countries, taking into account the area's economic conditions. Suppose that countries in recession favor a more expansionary policy than countries in expansion 1 .
Then if national business cycles are not fully synchronized, a conflict of interest between members arises. When governments of member countries have an informational advantage over the state of their domestic economy, such conflict may create an adverse selection problem: national authorities overemphasize their shocks in order to shape the common policy towards their needs. Ignoring the problem can be extremely costly, since the CCB may end up inappropriately implementing "stop and go" policies that add to inflation variability. This informational problem magnifies the one-policy-fits-all inefficiency discussed in the optimal currency area literature. The paper's main result is that, in a currency area with asymmetric information, the optimal monetary policy must over-react to large symmetric shocks and under-react to asymmetric ones of unequal size. Overall, asymmetric information aggravates the problem of tailoring the policy response to the state of the union's economy, and causes a welfare loss that is increasing in the number of member countries. We also show that disregarding some of the information reported by national authorities and adopting a "rule of thumb" is never efficient, although this rule closely mimics the optimal rule when large shocks are either very rare or very frequent.
The paper's central idea is that there is an important information asymmetry between policymakers in different countries as to what they know about domestic macroeconomic conditions. This can give rise to outright misrepresentation of statistics (for example a country might misreport its unemployment rate, see below), misinterpretation of statistics (for example national policymakers might be better placed than their foreign counterparts to judge the implications of labor market outcomes on the deviation of output from trend), deliberate lack of transparency about the information sources, gathering process, and timeliness of release of statistics (these issues are covered by the IMF surveillance procedure under the heading of Report On Observance of Standard and Codes (ROSC) 2 ) In his presidential address to the International Statistical Institute, Felligi (1989) [12] raises the issue quite clearly:
"..Statistical information is a product with peculiar attributes. One of them is that users are seldom in a position to check its quality directly. Yet data that are not trusted are clearly of little utility, whatever their intrinsic quality".
The case of the rate of unemployment in the UK is quite suggestive. In the 80's British labor economists have been bewildered by the ever-changing definition of unemployment.
Paul Gregg [14] (1994) recalls that "..Charges ...against the count method of estimating unemployment have concerned allegations about politically inspired manipulation of the figures through numerous changes in coverage during the 1980s. The supporting evidence for these changes is that all but one of these changes have been unidirectional-downwards. Critics have expressed a view that calculating unemployment on the old (pre-1982) coverage would result in a considerably higher total figure."
Quoting the IMF website, "ROSCs summarize the extent to which countries observe certain internationally recognized standards and codes. The IMF has recognized 11 areas and associated standards as useful for the operational work of the Fund and the World Bank. These comprise data; monetary and financial policy transparency; fiscal transparency; banking supervision; securities; insurance; payments systems; corporate governance; accounting; auditing; and insolvency and creditor rights". 3 According to Bartholomew at al.(1995) [2] "...in the 1970s, the figure for unemployment broadly related to those receiving unemployment benefits, plus those who did not receive benefits but registered themselves regularly for possible work. Increasingly during the early 1980's the latter group was excluded from the count and the former group was tightened up. For example, in 1981, some 195000 individuals were struck off the count by the removal of those in training or in temporary work; in 1982, a further 216000 individuals were struck off when benefit claimants only were included in the figures; in 1983, some 107000 men who were over 60 years of age, not working and not entitled to benefits or credits, were similarly struck off the count.
An important consequence of these and other changes was the unease expressed by the general public about what the published figures actually meant and how the changes, which occurred both up or down, could be effectively assessed".
Lack of confidence in the figures became so serious that a government Working Party was set up to analyze the question: according to the ensuing official report, "The level of unemployment in a country is a key indicator of economic and social well-being.
The UK figures published monthly are eagerly awaited and hotly debated. Recently, and especially during the early part of 1994, debate became intense and it was claimed, on behalf of the Opposition, that the figures were worthless. It was implied that they were manipulated by the government for its own political ends. This matter is of great concern for Society..."(Bartholomew, Moore, Smith, Allin 1995) [2] 4
We think that these informational problems are potentially more serious at the international level, for arrangements such as currency unions and federal redistribution schemes. In this spirit, Bordignon, Manasse and Tabellini (2001) [5] argue that "...in the European Union or in countries such as Russia and China (Laffont 1995 [15] )..., national or regional governments are the primary source of statistical information...while federal authorities are at a disadvantage in assessing the quality of this information" [5] .
With the exception of Bottazzi and Manasse (1998) [6] [19] and Lockwood (1996) [18] study the issue of public 4 Another example is the elimination of the interest rate on mortgages from the definition of the CPI in 1993 in Britain. This was done in order to prevent inflation form shooting up whenever interest rates were raised. Avinash Dixit jokingly tolds us about the "Dixit and Goodhart" definition of "core" inflation: the index covering all goods whose price have not increased (!). Other interesting stories on statistics can be read on the BBC site: http://www.stats.org/statswork/bbc-stats.htm. 5 With respect to our previous work, here we do not insist on microfoundations, and change the equilibrium concept from dominant to Bayesian strategies.
goods provision when technology is imperfectly observable. Finally, Laffont [15] (1995) studies fiscal arrangements in China.
The plan of the paper is the following. Section 2 presents the model. Section 3 considers the benchmark case of full-information. In Section 4 we extend the set-up to asymmetric information. First we show that the full information policy is not incentive compatible, and we discuss the potential costs of ignoring the problem of information. We then discuss the optimal policy rule. Section 5 briefly discusses some possible extensions of the model, and Section 6 summarizes the main results.
The Model
There are two endowment-economies, each populated by an identical representative agent.
The agent's indirect utility function, W, depends on inflation π, and on an output shock, e, representing the deviation of output from trend. A negative realization means that the economy is in "recession", a positive one that the economy is in "expansion". The output shocks are independent across countries. We require the indirect utility function W (π, e) to have some intuitive properties:
where W x (.) denotes the partial derivative of W with respect to x. The first property captures the positive effects of output on consumption. The second and the third represent the idea that, at a low level inflation, π is beneficial; above a certain threshold, however, the benefits peter out and the costs of inflation increase. Notice that, due to the last inequality, a country's most preferred rate of inflation falls when the state of the economy improves.
In the appendix we present a dynamic general equilibrium model of the money-into-the utility-function type, where welfare in steady state exhibits such properties. For this model, adapted from Bottazzi and Manasse(2002)( [7] ), seigniorage is an efficient way of financing the provision of a public good, when inflation is low. When inflation is high, however, distortions in money demand and declining marginal utility of the public good set in, and reduce welfare.
Moreover, in that model the preferred rate of inflation declines with output for the following reason: high output yields high fiscal revenue and reduces the need of seigniorage revenue.
For expositional purposes we assume that the indirect utility function takes the quadratic form
and assume that e can take a finite number of realizations in the interval [−s, s] , s > 0 with probabilities p(e), P e p(e) = 1, expected value E(e) = 0, and variance σ 2 e . The disturbances across countries, e and e 0 ("the other's" state), are independent. It will be very convenient to consider the particular case where e can take only four possible realizations, {−s, −s/2, s/2, s} , with equal probability p(e) = 1/4. Under the assumption 6 of discrete uniform distribution, the shocks have zero mean, and variance σ 3 Full Information
Monetary Independence
Next we characterize the full information optimal policy when each country has monetary sovereignty. We show that the optimal rule is counter-cyclical.
After the realization of the shock, the national central bank chooses inflation so as to
The optimal inflation rule is simply given by
The first-best rule is to run an expansionary policy in bad times and a contractionary policy in good times. We can calculate the expected utility in this benchmark case, as well as the first two moments of inflation 7 :
6 We carry on with the more general notation p(e) since we discuss a more general case later on. 7 We normalize the f (e) function so that P e p(e)f (e) = 0.
In the benchmark of monetary independence the average inflation rate is zero, and its variability exactly matches that of the "fundamentals".
CCA under Full Information
Next we describe the optimal policy in a CCA when the two states e, e 0 are fully observable.
We show that the standard inefficiency of the Optimal Currency Area literature arises because of the impossibility to tailor the common policy to individual needs. In a Common
Currency Area, monetary policy is set by the common central bank, the CCB, which chooses a common inflation rate, after observing the realizations of the shocks in the two countries.
Thus the CCB solves
The optimal policy rule is
What matters now is the aggregate (mean) state of the economy. This rule has some intuitive properties: i) it treats both types equally (it is "fair"), π E (e, e 0 ) = π E (e 0 , e) ; ii) it is symmetric, π(e, e 0 ) = −π(−e, −e 0 ); iii) it is non-increasing in the shocks, π E e (e, e 0 ) ≤ 0 , so that inflation is not raised when more favorable shocks are reported, and iv) it coincides with the first-best rule when shocks are identical, π E (e, e) = π(e). The last two properties show the nature of the conflict of interest between countries, when shocks differ: the country experiencing a recession ("boom") favors a looser (tighter) monetary policy than the one implemented by the CCB: π(e 0 ) > π E (e, e 0 ) > π(e) for e > e 0 . Thus the rule gives rise to the standard inefficiency of currency unions, the one-policy-fits-all, whenever shocks are asymmetric. We can compare the two regimes by computing welfare:
Compared to the regime of Monetary Independence, the CCA reduces welfare considerably 8 . The loss does not stem from the average level of inflation, which is the same in the two regimes, but from the inability to tailor the policy response to the shocks. Since these are assumed to be independent, the policy rule cannot match the variability of the state of each individual economy. This is the standard loss of an independent policy tool for stabilization.
Asymmetric Information
Suppose now that both governments have some private information regarding the state of their own economy: the domestic government observes e but not e 0 , and viceversa the foreign one. The CCB cannot verify either one. In such circumstances, the policy rule of the CCB must be contingent on the states reported by the two governments, e e, e e 0 . Each government may try to exploit its informational advantage in order to induce the CCB to choose a policy that better fits the state of its own economy. If the CCB ignores this incentive, it ends up choosing the "right" policy for the "wrong" state. Therefore, she must design a policy rule such that truthful revelation occurs. Next we show that, in order to "separate" the types and extract the correct information, the rule must over-react to large symmetric shocks and under-react to small asymmetric ones.
The game
Let's be more precise about the game being played. The timing is the following. In stage 1 the CCB designs a policy rule π(e e, e e 0 ) that depends on the reports. In stage 2 the shocks are realized, but only national governments observe national realizations. In stage 3, given the policy rule, countries simultaneously choose a report in order to maximize their own expected utility, where the expectation is taken over the other country's report. Finally, the CCB implements the rule according to the reported states.
The optimal reporting strategy of "type" e, R(e, π(e e, e e 0 )) consists in choosing the state to report, e e, so as to maximize his own expected utility, taking the expectations over the other country's report:
R(e, π(e e, e e 0 )) = arg max e e E e e 0 W (π(e e, e e 0 ), e) ,
where E e e 0 denotes type e expectation of the other country's report, e e 0 . An equilibrium with truthful revelation is defined as a set of reports e e, e e 0 and policy rule π(e e, e e 0 ), such that i) given the policy rule, each country chooses an optimal report, R(.); ii) reports are truthful, R(e, π(e e, e e 0 )) = e; and iii) the policy rule is optimal, in the sense that it maximizes expected welfare:
π(e e, e e 0 ) = arg max π U(π(e e, e e 0 ), e) + U (π(e e, e e 0 ), e 0 ) .
The policy can be viewed as a contract that the two parties (the governments) sign before the realization of the shocks. The contract describes the rate of inflation that the CCB must implement in all possible contingencies.
Incentives to lie
Here we show that the second-best rule π E (.) (7) does not induce truth-telling, i.e. it is not incentive-compatible. Intuitively, given this rule, each country is tempted to overemphasize its shock, so as to pull the rate of inflation closer to its most preferred rate π(e). But then, if the governments systematically lie to the CCB, and CCB insists on applying π E , the consequence is a sharp drop in welfare. The CCB can do better, but at the cost of introducing some distortions in her policy rule.
To see this, first we need to calculate the optimal report when the rule π E (.) is implemented.
Having observed the realization of his own state, type e chooses his report by forming an expectation on e e 0 . We can write a country expected welfare 9 as
where E e e 0 is the country's expectation of the other's report, e e 0 , V ar e e 0 [π] is the variance with respect to the same expectation, and e is known. Equation (7) implies that V ar e e 0 [π] 9 We thank an anonymous referee for suggesting this leaner way to prove the result.
is independent of the country's own report, e e, while the symmetric structure of the setup implies that E e e 0 (e e 0 ) = 0. Thus the country can choose e e to maximize −(1/2)(−e e/2) 2 − e(−e e/2), which yields e e = 2e.
In words, when the policy π E is followed, both reports will "exaggerate" the shock, whenever possible. Those who indeed experience the extreme states, ±s, are constrained to report the truth, since e = ±2s simply does not exist. Moreover, types ±s have no scope for under-reporting: if they declare an intermediate state, they end up pushing the CCB in the "wrong" direction". 10 Conversely, the intermediate types will always lie under the full information rule. The mild-recession type, −s/2, for example, expects the other to report zero on average, so he knows that if he declares the truth and the CCB follows the rule π E (e e, e e 0 ), he will get on average π E = s/4. But this policy is "too tight" for him: his first best is π(−s/2) = s/2 > s/4. In order to induce the CCB to implement a looser policy, he declares that the economy is experiencing a large recession (and report −s instead). By so doing (if the CCB believes him) he expects to get away with his first best,
The same argument holds for type s/2, who will always exaggerate the positive state and report a "boom" s, in order to get a tighter policy. 
The Dangers of "Closing the Eyes"
The implication of this is striking: should the CCB "close her eyes" and adhere to the full information rule when governments cheat, she would end up alternating between extremely loose, π E (−s, −s) = s, and extremely tight, π E (s, s) = −s, policies. With governments cheating, expected welfare U C (π E ) would fall :
In this example, cheating implies a 20% welfare loss with respect to the full information
Clearly, this loss stems from the effective adoption of a stop 10 For example, type −s likes a very expansionary policy π(−s) = s, and, if he tells the truth, he expects to get a rate of inflation π E = s/2 which is lower than desired. However, if he lies and reports, for example, −s/2, he only harms himself, as he manages to induce an even less expansionary policy, π E = s/4. 11 This argument exploits the fact that Eπ E (.) = π E (E(.)) due to the linearity of π E (.).
and go policy that leads to large swings in inflation. The variance of inflation becomes 60%
(=16/10-1) larger than under full information
The Optimal Policy Under Asymmetric Information
The CCB can do better by designing a policy rule that is incentive compatible. We apply the revelation principle to our game, so that if an equilibrium of the game exists, it must also be a solution to the following problem: the CCB chooses a policy rule that maximizes expected welfare subject to the incentive compatibility constraints. 12 We assume that the rule must satisfy property iii) of Section 4, namely being "non increasing in the shocks".
This guarantees that "extreme" type ±s will never be willing to lie, so that we need only to consider the incentive compatibility constraint of types s/2 (and −s/2). Also, properties i)-ii) of fairness and symmetry turn out to be satisfied by the optimal rule. Formally, this solves P roblem 1:
U(π(e, e 0 ), e) + U(π(e, e 0 ), e 0 ) (12) 
The incentive compatibility constraint (13) states that, under the rule, type s/2 is at least as well off, in expected terms, by reporting s/2 rather than s. A similar interpretation applies to equation (14) for type −s/2.The solution of this problem is simplified by noting that, because symmetry of the optimal rule, π(e, e 0 ) = −π(−e, −e 0 ), either both constraints bind, or neither does. Similarly, the fairness property, π(e, e 0 ) = π(e 0 , e), implies that we need not write down the two constraints for country e 0 . 13 In the Appendix we prove the following proposition: 12 We do not consider the participation constraint on the basis that there is no possibility of opting out of the CCA. We also assume that the rule cannot be renegotiated. 13 The first one would read: P e p(e)W (π(e, s/2), s/2) ≥ P e p(e)W (π(e, s), s/2) which coicides with the one in the text when π(e, e 0 ) = π(e 0 , e) holds.
Proposition 1 Let π S (e e, e e 0 ) denote the inflation rule that solves Problem 1. When states of nature are equally likely, p(e) = 1/4, all e, this policy satisfies the following properties: i) it over-reacts to large symmetric shocks, INSERT HERE FIGURE 1
Note that the policy π S is fair (π S (e, e 0 ) = π S (e 0 , e)) and symmetric (π S (e, e 0 ) = −π S (−e 0 , −e)
). The proposition has an intuitive interpretation. The rule must make the intermediate types indifferent, in expected terms, between reporting the truth and lying. It does so in two ways (see Figure 1 ). First, in order to discourage extreme (false) reports, it makes inflation so high in symmetric bad states (−s, −s), and so low in good ones (s, s) that only countries who really experience these shocks may want to say so. This explains point i). U(π S (e, e 0 ), e) = 4. 961 32
. 921 32 = 0.310s 2 < 10 32 14 We assume that indifference is enough to induce truth telling in the calculation below.
In this example welfare under asymmetric information falls below full information, but just 0.8 percent (= 1 − U S /U E )), compared to the 20 percent loss of the cheating outcome. On one hand, by penalizing "large" reports, the policy makes sure that these are reported less frequently, i.e. only when they truly occur. On the other, the large induced inflation swings that occur in extreme states are compensated by smaller swings when asymmetric shocks of different size are reported.
Is "Pooling" (Rule of Thumb) Ever Optimal?
In order to eliminate the incentive to lie of the intermediate type, the optimal rule may in principle be contingent only on a sub-set of the reported information, e.g. the "sign"
(expansion/recession) of the shocks, but not their size (large/small). This possibility is interesting since the optimal policy rule could then be interpreted as a "rule of thumb", a rule that picks the same rate of inflation irrespective of whether shocks s or s/2 are reported. Next we show that "pooling" cannot be optimal. By definition the rule of thumb must maximize expected utility (12) and satisfy the constraints
It is immediate to show (see the Appendix) that the first order conditions for the optimal rule in states (s/2, s), (s, s), (s/2, s/2) cannot be satisfied by the same inflation rate. Thus "pooling" cannot be optimal.
15 15 By computing the expected utility under the pooling π P rule one finds that U (π P (e, e 0 )) = 4.5 32
The pooling rule is clearly preferable to the cheating outcome, (confront (16) and (11)), but it is worse than the optimal rule (confront (16) and (15)).
Extensions
Next we discuss some possible extensions of the model. First we consider the case where small and large shocks occur with different probabilities. Second, we briefly discuss the case of many countries.
Distribution of Shocks
Suppose that "large" and "small" shocks occur with different probabilities. How does this affect the results? Two important things happen. First, when the probability associated to either small or large shocks tends to zero, the full information solution applies: the CCB can safely ignore the reports concerning states that occur with zero probability. Second, when large shocks becomes sufficiently likely, the relative inefficiency of the rule of thumb (pooling) becomes negligible.
Assume that the probabilities satisfy
with 0 ≤ p ≤ 1, so that large shocks are relatively rare when p < 1/2.
Back to Full Information
Consider the "extreme" cases when p → 0 or p → 1 : here the problem of asymmetry of information disappears. It is easy to show that when large shocks almost "never" occur, p → 0, the CCB can safely disregard "large reports" and optimally chooses π
Similarly, if p → 1, so that small shocks "never" occur, the CCB can safely disregard "small reports" and optimally chooses π S (s, s/2) = π E (s, s).
The Inefficiency of the Rule of Thumb
It is easy to show that the "pooling" rule for the general case of distribution (17) is given
Clearly, the higher the probability of large shocks the higher (in absolute value) inflation under pooling. When p = 1/2, the solution is π P + = −(3/4)s, as before. It is very difficult to find a closed form solution for the optimal policy π S for the case p ∈ (0, 1). However, we can resort to a numerical solution (see Table 1 below) and calculate the levels of welfare associated to the optimal rule and the rule of thumb, for different values of the probability of large shocks, p 17 :
INSERT TABLE 1 HERE
In the extreme cases of only small (p = 0) or large (p = 1) shocks, the two policies are equivalent (we are effectively in the case of full information). If large and small shocks are equally likely, p = 1/2, (p(e) = 1/4, all e) we are back to our discrete uniform distribution, with the pooling π P rule being outperformed by the optimal rule, π S . Interestingly, the relative loss from adopting the rule of thumb first rises and then falls with the probability of large shock, p. The reason is as follows. The two policies attain the full information outcome at the extremes, p = 0, p = 1: however, welfare is increasing and concave in p under π S , while it is increasing and convex under pooling, so that their ratio initially rises and then falls with p. 17 In theAppendix we show that part i) of Proposition 1 goes through in non uniform case p(e), i.e.the rule must over-react to large asymmetric shock. Similarly, the result that symmetric reports (e e, −e e) are not distorted still applies. Finally, a sufficient condition for the rule to under-react to asymmetric shocks of different magnitude (cf part ii of the proposition), is that the probability of large shocks p ≥ 1/2. For the remaining cases (cf part iii of Proposition 1) the optimal policy distorts inflation towards the extremes or the middle depending on whether p > or < 1/2 , respectively.
Many Countries
Having many countries in the Currency Area aggravates the distortions of asymmetric information. The standard inefficiency one-policy-fits all increases with the number of members, and so does the incentives to misreport information: hence larger distortions in the policy rule are required to prevent mimicking. In order to sketch the argument, let the CCA be formed by j = 1, 2, ...N ≥ 2 identical countries, experiencing independent, discrete-uniformly distributed shocks e j . The full information rule now is
so that inflation has mean zero, and its variance σ 2 π = σ 2 e /N tends to zero as N goes to infinity. This implies, from the Central Limit Theorem, that the CCB will "always" choose an inflation rate equal to zero. It is easy to see that the incentive to exaggerate the shock rises with N. Proceeding as in Section 4.1 18 , the optimal report of country i is now e e i = Ne i .
The larger the number of member countries, the larger the incentive to over-emphasize the shock. As N grows sufficiently large, it must become increasingly costly to separate the types.
Hence the distortions associated with asymmetric information are likely to be fostered by the number of CCA members.
Discussion
When members of a currency union experience idiosyncratic shocks, a conflict of interest over authorities exaggerate their shocks in order to shape the common policy towards their needs.
Ignoring the problem can be extremely costly, since the monetary authority ends up inappropriately implementing "stop and go" policies that are detrimental to welfare. The paper shows that monetary policy must over-react to large symmetric shocks and under-react to asymmetric shocks of different size. In order to provide the incentives for truthful revelation, monetary policy becomes unduly expansive when all members are in serious depressions and unduly restrictive when they all experience booms; conversely, it reacts too little to economic conditions when some face mild expansions (contractions) and some are in depression (boom). Overall, asymmetric information aggravates the problem of tailoring the policy response to the state of the union's economy, and causes a welfare loss, that is increasing in the number of member countries. We also show that disregarding some of the information reported by national authorities and adopting a "rule of thumb" is never efficient, although a rule of thumb closely mimics the optimal rule when large shocks are either very rare or very frequent. where f M t = M t + M * t represents the common currency, which is held by both domestic and foreign households 20 , and σ = 1 − σ * represent the share of the common currency that is held by domestic consumers. For simplicity we assume that e t ,is a zero mean i.i.d. disturbance. Depending on the exchange rate regime, the national Central Bank (or the CCB) chooses the sequence of nominal
Government budget constraint
National governments raise revenue by taxing the endowment at proportional rate τ t and by seigniorage. For the sake of simplicity we do not consider the choice of τ t which is assumed mandatory fixed and constant over time. Again, the budget constraint differs between monetary regimes. Under MI we have
In turn, in a CCA, the constraint reads:
By substituting the government constraint into the consumer constraint for MI and CCA respectively, one finds the resource constraint c t + g t = e t
Solution
Solving the private sector maximization problem for the case of MI (20) subject to the constraint (21), and re-arranging the first order conditions for c t and M t+1 , recalling linearity, yields 
where we have exploited the fact that the multipliers of the two incentive compatibility constraints are equal by symmetry:λ
Since the r.h.s. of (29) (28) would imply that also W π(−s,−s) (−s, π P − ) = 0, which is not possible since it violates the assumption that W πe (π, e) < 0 all π and e. Comparing (39) with (29) we can see that when p = 1/2, π(−s, −s/2) is not distorted, while if p > 1/2 ,the r.h.s. of (39) is positive , since W π(−s,−s/2) (−s/2, π) < 0,so that π(−s, −s/2) is below the full information value, see part iv) of Proposition 2.
Finally, comparing (45) with (34) we see that π(−s/2, s/2) is the same as in full information. This and equation (44) implies that also π(−s, s) from (41) is the same as under full information, cf point iii).
The case for small asymmetric shocks, (−s/2, s) is slightly more complex, since there are multiple solutions. Computing these solutions numerically and taking the one that delivers global maximum gives a value of π(−s/2, s) < s/2 (which is reasonable since the π(−s/2) = s/2). When this inequality is satisfied, we see that the r.h.s. of (46)
is surely negative for p ≥ 1/2. Thus, under this condition, the l.h.s. of (46) 
